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NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Premiums Paid in Contemplation of Death:
The High Cost of Premiums
Under § 2035 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, transfers of interest
in property made by a decedent for a less than adequate consideration
and within three years of death are presumptively made in contemplation
of death. Consequently, they are includible in the decedent's gross estate. I
The scope of this provision has been debated and contested both legis-
latively and judicially. Until the development of a recent court trend,
noted and developed in this paper, there has been a fluctuation of tax
consequences of certain transactions on a decedent's estate. The trans-
actions under discussion will deal with life insurance premiums.
Where there is no dispute that the premiums were paid or transferred
in contemplation of death, the sole question to be explored is what amount
should be included in the decedent's gross estate? 2 Courts confronted
with this question have produced conflicting results, sometimes based
on justifiable distinctions.
First National Bank of Oregon v. U.S. (hereinafter cited as Slade)
involved such a question. Here the Court of Appeals 3 upheld the District
Court's 4 decision to include in the decedent's gross estate the full amount
of the life insurance proceeds. This decision rejected the appellant's con-
tention to include only the dollar amount of the premiums paid.
In 1966 the decedent, Mr. Slade, had his wife sign applications for
two twenty-year term insurance policies on his life. The policies were
issued to Mrs. Slade as owner and beneficiary. All the premiums were
paid by Mr. Slade. Within three years of the issuance, Mr. Slade died.
Since there was no dispute that the policies were procured and premiums
were paid in contemplation of death § 2035 governs.
Considering this background the question left unanswered is, what is the
value of the interest transferred in contemplation of death. In concluding
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2035 provides:
(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
(b) Application of General Rule-If the decedent within a period of three years
ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth) transferred an interest in property,
relinquished a power, or exercised or released a general power of appointment,
such transfer, relinquishment, exercise or release shall, unless shown to the contrary,
be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this
section and sections 2038 and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers and powers of
appointment); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise or release made before
such 3-year period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
2 See Rhodes, Contemplation of Death: The Problem of Life Insurance Premiums,
24 TAX LAWYER 589, (1971).
3 488 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1973).
4 352 F. Supp. 1157 (D.C. Ore. 1972).
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that the full amount of the proceeds should be included in Mr. Slade's
gross estate, the court relied heavily on three cases; Detroit Bank and Trust
Co. v. U.S., 5 Bel v. U.S., 6 and Chase National Bank v. U.S.7
The Detroit Bank case involved a whole life policy purchased by a
trust funded with decedent's money for the specific purpose of purchasing
the policy. The Bel case involved a one-year accidental death policy in
the names of decedent's children, purchased with community funds8 of
the decedent. In the Detroit Bank, Bel and Slade cases the coverage had
been purchased within three years of decedent's death, with his funds
and at his instigation. The courts included the full proceeds of the policies in
the respective decedent's gross estate.
In the Slade case the appellants argued that, since Mr. Slade never
really owned the policies, he could not have transferred any interest
in them within the three-year period. Chase National was used to quiet
this argument. Justice Stone speaking for the Supreme Court had stated
the following:
Obviously, the word 'transfer' in the statute [§§ 401 and 402
(f) of the Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §§ 401, 402 (f), 42 Stat.
277, 279 taxing the 'transfer' of insurance proceeds at death], or
the privilege which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken
in such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular
items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee.
It must, we think, at least include the transfer of property procured
through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected
at his death, of having it pass to another. Sec. 402 (c) taxes transfers
made in contemplation of death. It would not, we assume, be ser-
iously argued that its provision could be evaded by the purchase of
a decedent from a third person of property, a savings bank book for
example, and its delivery to the intended beneficiary on the pur-
chaser's death, or that the measure of the tax would be the cost and
not the value of the proceeds at the time of death. 9
The Slade court maintained that there was only a formal difference be-
tween decedent buying the policy, then transferring it to Mrs. Slade and
Mrs. Slade procuring the policy at the urging of Mr. Slade, with his funds.
5 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
6452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), affg in part 310 F. Supp. 1189 (D.C. La. 1970), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972).
7 278 U.S. 327 (1929).
8 Bel was a resident of a community property state, Louisiana. Community property is in-
cluded in a decedent's gross estate only to the extent of the decedent's interest under the local
law. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 2033, 2042. This interest is one-half the value of the com-
munity property (generally).
9 278 U.S. at 327. This same language was relied upon heavily in Bel and Detroit Bank.
The Chase case held the estate tax imposed by §§ 401 and 402(f) to be constitutional as a tax
on the transfer of property (and not a direct tax on the property). See Millikin v. U.S., 283
U.S. 15 (1931); U.S. v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931). But see Gorman v. U.S., 288 F. Supp.
225, 228 (D.C. E.D. Mich. 1968) and Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 329.
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Therefore, the gift must necessarily be one of a property interest in the
policy. 10 The court seemed to feel that this procedure of having Mrs.
Slade apply for the policy at Mr. Slade's urging and with his funds was
a form of an illusory transfer and that a testamentary substitute oc-
curs therein. The court stated that the only policy that would support such
a formalistic distinction would be to encourage tax evasion, a position
which the court undoubtedly is opposed to. The court further elaborated
that for the taxpayer to prevail in his argument would also undermine
[§ 2035's] statutory goal1 as well as give the term transfer an unduly
technical 12 meaning. In U.S. v. Wells, 3 the court said the purpose
of § 2035 "is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus
to prevent the evasion of estate tax."' 4 The Slade court subsequently
adopted this language. 15 Slade also pointed out the following:
[to agree with appellant's theory] ... would create an anomalous
exception to section 2035 in the case of life insurance policies.
The normal rule under section 2035 is that property transferred in
contemplation of death is valued as of the decedent's death, not
as of the date the property was transferred. Treas. reg. 20.2035-1(e). 16
Referring to Justice Raum's dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue,'" the court further stated that, if only the
tax were imposed upon the premiums this would not reflect the appreciated
value of what the premiums purchased--the right to the proceeds.
The court claimed that its determination to include the proceeds in
decedent's gross estate does not impermissibly 8 reincarnate the old
1" See, Rhodes, Contemplation of Death: The Problem of Life Insurance Proceeds,
24 TAX LAWYER 589, 591, 596 (1971).
1 488 F.2d at 577.
12 id.
13 283 U.S. 102.
14 Id. at 117.
I 488 F.2d at 577.
36 Id. 26 C.F.R. 2035-1 (e) (1972):
(e) Valuation. The value of an interest in transferred property includible in a decedent's
gross estate under this section (2035) is the value of the interest as of the applicable valuation
date. In this connection, see sections 2031, 2032 and the regulations thereunder. However,
if the transferee has made improvements or additions to the property, any resulting enhance-
ment in the value of the property is not considered in ascertaining the value of the gross estate.
Similarly, neither income received subsequent to the transfer nor property purchased with such
income is considered.
It should be noted that choosing the alternate valuation date would have no effect on
the amount of insurance includible in decedent's gross estate. See also Estate of Humphrey
v. Comm'r., 162 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 332 U.S. 817, decedent gave his children
a cash gift in contemplation of death. The gift had been invested. At decedent's death the
gift was worth about one-half its original value. The court held under the 1939 Code, for estate
tax purposes the gift was to be valued at the full cash transferred. (Noted 61 HARV. L. REV.
365 (1948)). Note the conflict imposed on § 2035 valuations with the value of premiums trans-
ferred for gift tax purposes (Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(8) (1973)).
11 Estate of Inez Coleman, 52 T.C. 921, 927 (1969). See text accompanying note 41
infra.
38 488 F.2d at 578. See note 19 infra.
3
Lavender: Premiums Paid in Contemplation of Death: The High Cost of Premium
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1974
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
premium payment test1 9 phoenix-like from the language2 ° of § 2035.
It has been demonstrated how the court analyzed that what actually
took place was a transfer of an interest in the policy to be valued at the
date of the decedent's demise. Therefore, the court held that the full pro-
ceeds of the policy were to be included in the decedent's gross estate. The
following discussion will try to shed some light on the evolution of the above
holding.
BACKGROUND
§ 2035 dealt with numerous types of transfers. Some transfers have
been held taxable; others have not for a myriad of rationale. 2' The scope
of discussion will therefore be limited to the area of insurance premiums.
To concentrate upon this area even further, the focus will not be concerned
with whether the premiums were paid in contemplation of death, assuming
they were,2 2 but their value includable in the decedent's gross estate.
In Liebman v. Hassett,23 the decedent transferred the policy in con-
templation of death, but the transferee paid two annual premiums sub-
sequent to the transfer. The court held that the part of the proceeds pro-
portionate to the premiums paid by the transferee should be excluded from
decedent's gross estate. Weight was given to the fact that the insured
had "taken out" the policy. This case is cited for a merely historical per-
spective. 24 It also illustrates one of the methods used by the courts and
the Code to deal with premiums under § 2035.25
'9 The appellant argued that by the adoption of § 2042 (INT. REV. CODE OF 1954), which
eliminated the "premium payment" test, does not permit the inclusion of life insurance pro-
ceeds in a decedent's gross estate based on who paid the premiums. This argument was based
therefore, on Congressional intent. See note 31 infra. The "premium payment" test was found
in, INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 § 811 (g), as amended by § 404(a) (2) of the Revenue Act of 1942,
ch. 619 § 404(a) (2), 56 Stat. 944 (now § 2042 of the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954). The "premium
payment" test provided for inclusion in one's estate, life insurance based on who paid the
premiums, whether directly or indirectly. See Coleman, 52 T.C. 921. See also Goodson,
Are Insurance Proceeds Gifts in Contemplation of Death? 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 25, 26
(1965); Yohlin & Bemze, Some Unsolved Gift and Estate Problems of the Unfunded Ir-
revocable Insurance Trust, 41 TAXES 521, 533 (1963); Brown & Sherman, note 27 infra.
20 52 T.C. at 923, adopted by Slade 488 F.2d at 578.
21 See generally LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES, 60-79
(1962) and Supp. 21-27 (1972).
22 Due to insurance being so testamentary in nature, there is a more difficult burden of
proof to rebut. Therefore, even in the case of life insurance it is not conclusive that the
transfer was made in contemplation of death. See Hull v. Comm'r., 325 F.2d 367 (3d Cir.
1963); Landorf v. U.S., 408 F.2d 461 (Ct. Cl. 1969). But see Garrett's Estate v. Comm'r.,
180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); First Trust and Deposit Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F.2d 940
(2d Cir. 1943).
23 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945) affg 50 F. Supp. 537 (D.C. Mass.).
24 Id. This case arose under § 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (which was the predeces-
sor of the present § 2035(a) and is substantially the same but, the "premium payment"
test on which it relied has been rejected by § 2042 of the 1954 Code).21 This was considered "harsh" by some; See note 74 infra.
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Revenue Ruling 67-46326 was the first official, 27 published position
taken by the Internal Revenue Service in 1967. This publication involved
premiums paid under § 2035. The position basically followed the formula
set out in the preceding Liebman case. Revenue Ruling 67-463 ran into a
great deal of negative reaction by the courts. 28
Gorman v. U.S., 29 rejected 30 Revenue Ruling 67-463 shortly after it
was published. Here decedent's wife procured a five-year renewable,
convertible policy and held all incidents of ownership at all times. The
policy was purchased within one year of decedent's death with the sole
premium having been paid by the decedent. The court held that only the
actual amount of the premium was taxable to the decedent's estate, there-
fore this result would support appellant's position in the Slade case in
which the facts were essentially the same.
The Gorman court looked to Congressional intent in eliminating the
premium payment3 ' test and concluded that the courts and the govern-
26 1967-2 CUM. BULL. 329. Generally stated: when a decedent within three years ana in
contemplation of death, paid premiums on his own life policy and transferred the incidents
of ownership more than three years prior to his death, value of a proportionate part of amount
receivable as proceeds to those premiums paid by decedent within three years of death is
includible in his gross estate under § 2035, with the same result if the transferee originally
applied for the insurance. See 3 SW.U.L. REV. 124 (1971).
27 This was not a new position among District Directors. See Brown & Sherman, Pay-
ment of Premiums as Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 790
(1962); once this position was widely accepted, Brown & Sherman, supra; Mannheimer,
Wheeler & Friedman, Gifts of Life Insurance by the Insured, 13 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX.
260, n. 27b (1955); Schwartz, Life Insurance Planning, 35 So. CALIF. L. REV. 11, n. 52
(1961-2).
28 The position of the Internal Revenue Service (Rev. Rul. 67-463) was questioned in
the courts not less than twelve times and the Internal Revenue Service lost all those decisions
except one (First Nat'l Bank of Midland, Texas v. U.S., 69-1 U.S.T.C., 12,574 (W.D.
Tex. 1968)) which too, was shortly thereafter overturned on appeal (423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1970)).
29 288 F. Supp. 222 (D.C. E.D. Mich. 1968), appeal dismissed per stipulation. See
generally 82 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (1969); 67 MICH. L. REV. 812 (1969); 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
116 (1969); 43 TUL. L. REV. 882 (1969). See also 57 A.B.A.J. 475 (1967).
30 Revenue Rulings are not binding on the courts although they can be used as precedents.
They are official Internal Revenue interpretations of the Code.
31 The majority of the House Ways & Means Comm. justified the elimination of the
"premium payment" test (§ 811 (g) of the 1939 Code) by saying that life insurance should be
on the same footing with other property, since other property is not taxed to decedent's
estate, if he completely parted with the property during his life, merely because he paid the
consideration for it, H. Rep. No. 1337, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., A 316, A 317 (1954), U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1954, 4025. The majority's position was reaffirmed when the Congress
rejected a Treasury attempt, in 1957, to introduce a modified form of the "premium payment"
test into the Code, H.R. 8381, 85 Cong., ist Sess. 56 (1957). See List of Substantive Un-
intended Benefits and Hardships and Additional Problems for the Technical Amendments Bill
of 1957, item 27, p. 12, transmitted on Nov. 7, 1956 to Subcommittee on Internal Revenue
Taxation of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, by Treasury and Staff of Joint Comm.
on Internal Revenue Taxation, 288 F. Supp. at 227. But see the minority's view; that life
insurance is not like other property since it is testimentary in nature, H. Rep. No. 1337,
83 Cong., 2d Sess. B 14, B 15 (1954). The minority was also fearful that the majority's action
would ultimately eliminate taxation for estate tax purposes of life insurance proceeds, id.
5
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ment should not try to reenact the test through administrative tactics. 32
The court held the tax should be stipulated at the value of the res transferred,
at the time the res was transferred . 3  This meant that only the premium
dollar value should be included in decedent's gross estate.
In 1969, Coleman v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue3 4 also rejected
Revenue Ruling 67-463 as Gorman did. Here the insured's three daughters
purchased a policy 35 on the life of the decedent more than four years prior
to his death. The decedent never transferred or possessed any incidents
of ownership in the policy. However, the decedent did pay all of the pre-
miums in contemplation of death. The questions under consideration
were-i) What should be included in the decedent's gross estate and 2)
What really transferred? The taxpayer argued that the legislature's re-
peal of the premium payment test was the answer. While the District
Court in Gorman relied heavily on this very argument, here the Tax Court
observed that the repeal of the test under § 2042 has no real bearing
on cases arising under § 2035. The Gorman result was reached but
by different means. The court looked to "what the decedent parted
with as a result of her payment of the premium in contemplation of
death." '3 6 Giving their conclusion more credence, the court stated
that the decedent "held no interest whatsoever in the policy or its
proceeds." ' 37 The court recognized that "these payments kept the
economic substance of that ownership alive," but believed "the decisive
point is that what these payments created or maintained was theirs and
not hers." ' 38 The court maintained that there was no constructive trans-
fer 9 and held that the only thing actually "diverted from her estate was
actual money paid." ' 40 It should be noted that there was a strong dissent
by four justices .41
The Slade court found that the factual setting presented in Coleman,
was distinguishable from those presented in Slade. As noted, in Coleman,
the policy was procurea prior to the statutory period of § 2035 (b). In
32 288 F. Supp. at 230.
33 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
34 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
3' The record did not indicate the type of policy.
31 52 T.C. at 923.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 They believed that the value on "the date on which the transferred property is to be
valued is her death date and not when the premiums were in fact paid." Id. at 926 (Tietjens,
J.). Therefore the value is not measured by the dollar value of the premiums paid but by the
"insurance purchased with those premiums." Id. at 927, (Raum, J.), this represents the
appreciated value of the premiums. Dawson, J. citing Chase says look at the substance of
the transfer and you will see that what was actually diverted from decedent's estate were the
proceeds of the policy. Id. at 928. Simpson, Dawson, Raum and Tietjens, JJ. agree in each of
the others dissent. A total of three dissenting opinions were written. Id. at 926-8.
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Slade the policy was procured within the three-year period. In both cases
all premiums were paid by the decedent until the policy matured. In
Slade and Coleman, at all times the policies were owned by one other than
the decedent.
In 1970 First National Bank of Midland, Texas v. U.S. 42 was de-
cided. Here the Fifth Circuit 43 reversed a lower court decision favoring
the Government. 44 The Circuit Court held only the dollar value of de-
cedent's community interest in the premium payments was to be included
in his gross estate. The circumstances were similar to that of Coleman.
The decedent made all premium payments. Decedent's daughters took
out the policies, some seven years prior to his demise. The court em-
phasized the fact that decedent never had any ownership in the policies.
The court said, "the daughters could have paid the premiums themselves;
they were under no duty to allow someone else to pay them."' 45 The court
agreed with Coleman, that the rights maintained belonged to the owners
(i.e. the daughters). The court also agreed with Gorman in that the author-
ities cited 46 to support Revenue Ruling 67-463, do not support the con-
clusion reached. 47 In contrast to Slade, the same distinguishable facts
appear here as they did in Coleman.
Because of this lack of success 4s on the part of the Government, it
was indeed time for a new position. Revenue Ruling 71-49749 was issued
thereby revoking Revenue Ruling 67-463. Revenue Ruling 71-497 using
examples, made only premiums paid in contemplation of death on whole
life policies includable in a decedent's gross estate where the policies
were transferred by the decedent more than three years prior to his
death,50 with the same effect if it were a five-year term policy. Another
example is given to illustrate that the proceeds on a one-year accidental
death policy transferred5' nine months before the accidental death
42 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970).
43 This was the first time a question involving Rev. Rul. 67-463 was to be decided by a
Federal Circuit court.
44 69-1 U.S.T.C., 12,574 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
45 423 F.2d at 1288.
46 Chase Nat'l v. U.S., 278 U.S. 327 (1929). This case involved the question whether the
federal estate tax imposed on insurance policies owned by the decedent was a direct tax on
the property. Liebman v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 1947 (13t Cir. 1945). This case arose under
§ 302 (g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 and should be discounted since the "premium payment"
test which it rested on has been rejected. Scott v. Comm'r., 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
This case is irrelevant in that the underlying issue was the ownership of an insurance policy
under California law which depended upon payment of premiums as between the spouses.
41 423 F.2d at 1288.
48 See Eliasberg, Contemplation of Death and the Estate Taxation of Life Insurance:
What's Left of the Premium Payment Test, 111 TRusTS & EsTATEs 690, 743 n. 36 (1972).
49 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329 (1971).
50 See First Nat'l Bank of Midland, Texas v. U.S., 423 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1970); Gorman
v. U.S., 288 F. Supp. 222 (D.C. E.D. Mich. 1968); Coleman v. Comm'r., 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
"1 See Chase Nat'l Bank v. U.S., 278 U.S. 327 (1929), supports a broad nonliteral def-
inition of the term "transfer"; see the quote that note 9 supra, is cited from.
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would be includable in decedent's gross estate. 52 It should be recognized
that for the first time the Internal Revenue Service is giving effect to dif-
ferent types of policies (i.e. whole life, term and accidental death). 53 It
should also be recognized that the court house door is still open for litiga-
tion in two situations: 1) a whole life policy transferred within three
years of death with the premiums paid by decedent in contemplation of
death; 2) a term policy as to the above circumstances.
Bel v. U.S. involved a one-year accidental death policy.5 4 The policy
was procured by the decedent with his community funds less than a year
prior to his unfortunate demise. The decedent's children were the named
beneficiaries and the record owners. The District Court,55 first finding a
contemplation of death transfer, held only the amount of the premiums
paid were includable in decedent's gross estate. This holding was based
entirely on Coleman.
An appeal was taken by the Government to the Fifth Circuit, 56 The
Circuit Court looked at the situation in a different perspective. 57 The
court found no relevance to the legislative repeal of the "premium payment"
test, stating, "the taxpayer would have us apply a section of the code
dealing with lemons (section 2042), to one pertaining to oranges (section
2035)."'15 The Appeals Court gave no weight to Coleman since there the
policy was purchased more than three years prior to death5 9 and stated
the following:
Thus, the original contractual rights and ownership of the policy
in Coleman were created outside the presumptive period, and as
the Tax Court noted, those premiums paid in contemplation of
death served only to keep 'the economic substance of the ownership
alive.' In the instant case, however, the premium paid by the de-
cedent less than one year prior to his death engendered the entire
right, title and interest which the decedent's children had in the
accidental death policy. Essentially, every stick in the bundle of
rights constituting the policy and its proceeds had a genesis within
three years of the decedent's death.60
52 It appears that Rev. Rul. 71-497 might have been encouraged by recognition of the
decision in Bel v. U.S., 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971). The facts and conclusion of this example
are essentially those in Bel.
13 See 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 633-36 (1973).
14 This is actually a form of a term policy.
-5 310 F. Supp. 1189 (D.C. La. 1970).
56 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971), affg in part 310 F. Supp. 1189 (D.C. La. 1970), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972). Noted in 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 633 (1973).
-1 The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's finding of a transfer in contemplation
of death.
58 452 F.2d at 690.
19 Id. at n. 3 the court found First Nat'l. to be inappropriate but agreed that in Gorman,
the facts were indistinguishable but said; the Gorman court gave the Chase court's inter-
pretation of the term "transfer" a too restrictive meaning which would result in undermining
the purpose of § 2035.
60 452 F.2d at 690.
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Keeping in mind that while the decedent himself executed the original
insurance application and paid, with community funds, all of the premiums,
the policies from their inception were owned solely by the decedent's
three children. 6 ' Bel concluded that an individual should not be able to
circumvent § 2035 by passing the property to another.
Indeed, Bel stands for a complete new concept, via the views it sets
forth. The court dictated that what was actually transferred by the
premium payments of decedent was the right to the proceeds which the
premiums bought. Thus Bel stood for the proposition that not merely
the dollar value of the premiums but the proceeds were transferred in
contemplation of death. The court therefore held the entire proceeds of
the policy includable in decedent's gross estate.
In Bel the term transfer was given a peripheral view by giving it
a connotative rather than a denotative definition. This connotative view
complies with the implication the Supreme Court made in Chase, as to
the definition of the term "transfer." Bel cited Chase for support on
this view.
There are only technical factual distinctions between Bel and Slade.
In Slade the policy was a twenty-year term type and in Bel it was a one-
year accidental death policy. All other facts are essentially indistinguishable.
Indeed, it has been seen that Slade relied heavily on Bel and the results in
both seem to be correct.
The Detroit Bank and Trust Company v. U.S. contemplated by the
Sixth Circuit 62 is a post Revenue Ruling 71-497 decision. 63 Here the Circuit
Court reversed the lower court64 which had relied on Gorman, and others,65
to include only the dollar amount of the premiums in decedent's gross
estate. The Appeals Court66 included the full proceeds in decedent's gross
estate.
Here decedent created an irrevocable trust for his children six months
before his death. The decedent transferred, in contemplation of death,
money to the corpus for the purpose of purchasing insurance on his life.
The trust was the absolute owner of the policy. The court emphasized
the intent of Congress in enacting § 2035 was to tax transfers made in
contemplation of death at the estate tax rate rather than at a lower rate.
The court took cognizance that, subsequent to the lower court's decision,
two developments took place-Revenue Ruling 71-497, and the opinion
of Bel. The court did not speak any further about Revenue Ruling 71-497
61 Id. at 687.
62 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972).
63 Subsequent to the District Court's decision Rev. Rul. 71-497 was issued.
64 338 F. Supp. 971 (D.C. Mich. 1971).
" Merchantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n. v. U.S., 312 F. Supp. 108 (D.C. E.D. Mo. 1970);
Coleman v. Comm'r., 52 T.C. 921 (1969).
66 McAllister, C.J., dissented for reasons set forth by Judge Freeman in his District
Court's decision.
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except, that it reiterates the Government's position here. The court then
proceeding to eulogize Bel, simply incorporated segments of the Bel deci-
sion into their own. Giving even more credence to their own holding, the
court quotes from Millikin v. U.S.67 and U.S. v. Wells 68 to illustrate that they
are upholding Congressional intent by not giving the term "transfer" a tech-
nical meaning. The court unveiled the transaction to show a constructive
transfer really did take place, holding such transfer should be taxed at the
amount of the proceeds. The right to the proceeds were the interest actually
transferred.
The facts present here are slightly distinguishable from Slade. Here
it appears to have been a whole life policy while in Slade a term policy.
Here the policy was owned by a trust while in Slade it was owned by
decedent's wife. Here the premiums were paid from a trust which was
comprised of decedent's funds while Mr. Slade directly paid the premiums.
This decision closes one of the court house doors left open by Revenue
Ruling 71-497.
CONCLUSION
In response to the question as to value of the interest transferred,
three general views have emerged. The first was the proportional for-
mula6 9 view. This view was supported at a time by the court7 ° and
Government 7' and later also rejected by court 2 and Government.7 3 It
was thought to be harsh by some.7 4 Consequently, the second view,
form v. substance, for the reasons discussed above gained eminence.
This judicially 75 instilled view was joyously accepted by the taxpayers'
estates7 6 and unappreciated by the Government. 7 Finally, the substance
v. form view was adopted. This position was acquiesced to by all 78 but
ardently opposed by the taxpayer's estate.79 This came after the cursory80
positions taken by the courts and was converse to its previous position.
With the change from the form v. substance view to the substance
67 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
68 283 U.S. 102 (1931).
6 9 See notes 23 and 26 supra.
70 See Liebman v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
11 See notes 26 supra and 74 infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 28, 29, 34 and 42 supra. But see note 44 supra.
73 See note 49 supra.
14 See 82 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1969); Eliasberg, Contemplation of Death and the
Estate Taxation of Life Insurance: What's Left of the Premium Payment Test? 111 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 690, 743 (1972). But see Eliasberg, id. at 693 n. 22, 743.
71 See notes 29, 34 and 42 supra.
76 See note 75 supra.
11 See notes 44 and 75 supra.
71 See notes 3, 4, 5, 6 and 49 supra. See also note 41 supra.
. See notes 3, 4, 5 and 6 supra.
6 The "substance v. form" position emerged after only about 4 years after the "form v.
substance" position gained eminence.
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v. form view we see how the courts have carouseled 180 degrees in their
holdings while dealing with parallel facts."s This about-face in a few cases
may not be a trend but it is enough to initiate a trend. This trend hopefully
will continue to make illusory transfers lustrous, at least to the Treasury.8
One must concur with the results of Slade and what it represents. It fills
in the remaining missing-link of Revenue Ruling 71-497.13 The Slade court
found a transfer due to the substance and not the form of the transaction.
The transfer of the term policy in contemplation of death resulted in
the inclusion of the proceeds of the policy in the decedent's gross
estate.
The position the courts have taken, which coincides with Revenue
Ruling 71-497, is that a transfer of a life policy within § 2035 will result
in the proceeds to be included in decedent's gross estate. This position
can be avoided if the transfer was made in contemplation of death with
"lady luck" (more than three years prior to death). In such a case only the
premiums paid within § 2035 will be included in the decedent's gross
estate .8
4
JOEL RICHARD LAVENDER
Realistic Preparation for Life Outside Prison*
Working inmates of North Carolina's Department of Correction re-
ceive no pay for their labors, not even the token payment received by
prison inmates in most states. Honor grade inmates participating in the
Work Release Program are paid for their work. When asked why this
situation exists, prison officials usually state that it is due to lack of funds
and the fact that inmates are in prison to be punished and not rewarded for
their transgressions. Some of the hard-core conservatives maintain that to
pay a convict would be coddling criminals and affording them an oppor-
"I Compare Slade, 488 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1973), and Detroit Bank & Trust Co., 467
F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972), and Bel v. U.S., 452 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1971) with Gorman v. U.S.,
288 F. Supp. 222 (D.C. E.D. Mich. 1968) and Merchantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n. v. U.S.,
312 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Mo. 1970).
82 Large amounts of tax revenues are at stake. In 1972 over 1.6 trillion dollars of life in-
surance were in force in the U.S. alone. In 1972 the amount of coverage in force increased
about 8.2% over 1971 (which increased about 7.3% over 1970). THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS at 1021 (1974), source DIVISION OF STATISTICS & RESEARCH, INSTITUTE OF
LIFE INSURANCE.
83 The other missing-link was found in Detroit Bank, 467 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1972). That
case involved a whole ife policy. Therefore, whether it be whole life, term or accidental
death, if "transferred" within three years in contemplation of death the full proceeds will
be taxed to the decedent's gross estate.
84 Rev. Rul. 71-497, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 329 (1971). See First Nat'l Bank v. U.S., 423
F.2d 1286 (1970).
* This essay was written by Terry M. Luce, presently an inmate in the North Carolina
correctional system. See comment on Mr. Luce's essay, infra at 282.
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